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FRIENDLY FIRE AND THE LIM ITS OF THE MIL I TARY 
JUS TICE SYS TEM
Lieutenant Col o nel Mi chael J. Davidson, SJD, U.S. Army (Re tired)
On 22 April 2004, Cor po ral Pat rick Tillman was killed in ac tion in Af ghan i -stan as a re sult of friendly fire. The con tro ver sial death of the Army Ranger, 
who had given up a lu cra tive ca reer in pro fes sional foot ball to join the Army,
gen er ated wide spread me dia in ter est, mil i tary and con gres sio nal in ves ti ga tions,
books, and most re cently a doc u men tary. 
Ear lier in the day, Cor po ral Tillman’s Ranger pla toon had split into two
groups, with Tillman and his pla toon leader in the first group. Due to dan ger ous
ter rain, the sec ond group, led by the pla toon ser geant, aban doned its planned
route and in stead fol lowed the first group’s route in ve hi cles down a can yon road 
late in the day to ward the vil lage of Manah, where Tillman and the re main der of
the pla toon waited. The sec ond group came un der at tack and im me di ately be -
gan sup pres sive fire. Tillman, ac com pa nied by an Afghan Mil i tary Forces (AMF) 
sol dier car ry ing an AK-47 and the re main der of the pla toon, took up sup port ing 
po si tions in the vil lage and along an el e vated area
over look ing the road. As it moved for ward un der fire,
the first ve hi cle in the sec ond group saw muz zle
flashes com ing from the el e vated area and di rected
fire against it, kill ing Cor po ral Tillman and the
Afghan sol dier with him. Con tin u ing to fire as they
moved for ward, the Rang ers in the first ve hi cle also
wounded their own pla toon leader and his ra dio op er -
a tor.1 Re port edly, be fore he was shot Tillman had
thrown a smoke gre nade, and he and other Rang ers
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had shouted and waved in an un suc cess ful at tempt to stop the sec ond group’s at -
tack; in stead the move ment only at tracted ad di tional fire.2
The Army han dled the af ter math of the friendly-fire in ci dent poorly. Ini tial
in ves ti ga tions of the shoot ings were in ad e quate, Tillman’s uni form and equip -
ment were not pre served, ini tial re ports of Tillman’s death and his rec om men -
da tion for the Sil ver Star con tained fac tual in ac cu ra cies, and the Tillman fam ily
was not in formed about the true cir cum stances sur round ing Cor po ral Tillman’s 
death for thirty-five days.3 
How ever, more ger mane to this ar ti cle, in March 2006 the Army Crim i nal In -
ves ti ga tion Di vi sion (CID) be gan an ex ten sive crim i nal in ves ti ga tion into the
friendly-fire shoot ings, con clud ing that those Rang ers in the sec ond group “did
not com mit the of fenses of Neg li gent Ho mi cide or Ag gra vated As sault.”4 The CID
re port found that the Rang ers had been un der en emy fire and had rea son ably be -
lieved that they were de fend ing them selves and fir ing at the en emy.5 Ad di tion ally,
as con trib ut ing fac tors to the ac ci den tal shoot ing the CID noted poor vis i bil ity,
com mu ni ca tions prob lems be tween the two groups, and the pres ence of the AMF
sol dier.6 Ul ti mately, “seven Rang ers were ei ther rep ri manded or re ceived
nonjudicial pun ish ment as a re sult of the in ci dent,” in clud ing some sol diers re -
ceiv ing nonjudicial pun ish ment for “der e lic tion of duty,” but none of the sol diers
who were in volved in the Tillman shoot ing were deemed crim i nally cul pa ble.7 
In the wake of a friendly-fire in ci dent, par tic u larly when it draws the at ten -
tion of the me dia, there is a call for ac count abil ity. Some one needs to be held re -
spon si ble. Some one needs to go to jail. In deed, in some cases the facts seem so
egre gious that the need to sub ject to courts-mar tial the in di vid ual or in di vid u als 
re spon si ble is com pel ling.
How ever, the mil i tary has rarely used its jus tice sys tem as a re sponse to
friendly-fire in ci dents, and when it has, pros e cu tions have rarely been suc cess -
ful. Fur ther, the use of the mil i tary jus tice sys tem raises sig nif i cant col lat eral is -
sues, among them con cerns about sec ond-guess ing the ac tions of mem bers of
the armed forces in com bat, en cour ag ing hes i tancy and tim id ity, over re act ing to 
com plex sys temic prob lems by pun ish ing in di vid ual man i fes ta tions of those
prob lems, and fair ness in de ter min ing who should be held ac count able. As one
com men ta tor who has stud ied the his tory of friendly fire notes, “In the con fu -
sion of bat tle, ac ci dents oc cur. They are tragic, but who can take re spon si bil ity
for chaos?”8
This ar ti cle will de fine friendly fire and dis tin guish it from other forms of
bat tle field kill ings. It will re view the his tory of friendly fire, its causes, and its
per va sive ness. Fur ther, al though there ex ist few re ported cases, the ar ti cle will
dis cuss the of ten ill-fated at tempts to ad dress the prob lem through the Amer i -
can mil i tary jus tice sys tem. Fi nally, al though con ced ing the many dif fi cul ties
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in volved with achiev ing a suc cess ful court-mar tial pros e cu tion, the ar ti cle pos -
its that there re mains an im por tant, al beit dif fi cult, role for the mil i tary jus tice
sys tem in re sponse to such in ci dents.
FRIENDLY FIRE DE FINED
Friendly fire in volves the ac ci den tal kill ing in a com bat set ting of one sol dier by
an other of the same or an al lied force. The De part ment of De fense de fines the
term as “a cir cum stance in which mem bers of a U.S. or friendly mil i tary force are 
mis tak enly or ac ci den tally killed or in jured in ac tion by U.S. or friendly forces
ac tively en gaged with an en emy or who are di rect ing fire at a hos tile force or
what is thought to be a hos tile force.”9 Friendly fire dif fers con sid er ably from the
de lib er ate kill ing of an other, some times called “fragging,” which is sim ply pre -
med i tated mur der and readily ad dress able un der ar ti cle 118 of the Uni form
Code of Mil i tary Jus tice, when ca pa ble of proof. As one Ma rine Corps law yer
and scholar has noted, fragging is “Friendly Fire with Mal ice.”10 
The first doc u mented case of an Amer i can fragging dates to a de lib er ate kill -
ing in 1781 of an of fi cer by Con ti nen tal Army sol diers.11 Dur ing the Viet nam
con flict the num ber of fragging in ci dents be came a no tice able prob lem as the
dis ci pline of Amer i can forces de clined. The Ma rine Corps es ti mated be tween a
hun dred and 150 such in ci dents dur ing the course of the war, and un of fi cial
Army es ti mates were as high as 527 be tween 1969 and 1971.12 One ac a demic
found most Viet nam-era fraggings to be at tempts to in tim i date of fi cers and
non com mis sioned of fi cers, par tic u larly those who re fused to coun te nance ef -
forts to avoid com bat.13 
The con cept of friendly fire is sim i lar in many re spects to the ac ci den tal kill -
ing of ci vil ians, but such ac ci den tal kill ings ap pear to be treated dif fer ently and
are of ten re ferred to as “ci vil ian ca su al ties” or by more ster ile terms like “col lat -
eral dam age.” Re ported cases of courts-mar tial in volv ing the ac ci den tal deaths
of ci vil ians are rare. The most fa mous court-mar tial in volv ing an ac ci den tal at -
tack on ci vil ians oc curred dur ing World War II, and its fame was gen er ated less
by the na ture of the al leged mis con duct than by the iden tity of the pres i dent of
the court—a movie star, Col o nel Jimmy Stew art.
In that case, in March 1945 seven B-24 Lib er a tors on a bomb ing run to
Aschaffenburg, Ger many, be came lost, al leg edly due to bad weather and im -
prop erly work ing nav i ga tional equip ment, and un in ten tion ally bombed Zu rich, 
Swit zer land.14 Zu rich was deep in Swiss ter ri tory, near a large body of wa ter, and
the bomb ings gen er ated a strong re ac tion from the Swiss gov ern ment. Ul ti -
mately the lead plane’s pi lot and nav i ga tor were tried but ac quit ted of the charge
that they had “wrong fully and neg li gently” bombed friendly ter ri tory.15 
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NORMAL RATHER THAN EX CEP TIONAL
Friendly fire, also called “amicide,” “frat ri cide,” or “blue on blue,” has been a
con stant prob lem in war fare since the be gin ning of re corded time. In his com -
pre hen sive study of the sub ject, Geoffrey Regan traces such in ci dents from the
Greek hop lites to mod ern times. Regan opines that these types of ac ci den tal kill -
ings were so com mon from an tiq uity through at least me di eval times that “they
were scarcely wor thy of com ment un less they re lated to a leader of note struck
down by mis chance.”16
Friendly fire has oc curred in bat tles in which only one force was on the bat tle -
field. For ex am ple, dur ing a night march in 1788 the rear of an Aus trian col umn
near Karansebes, Transylvania, thought the shots and shouts from drunken sol -
diers at the head of the col umn in di cated a Turk ish at tack; the sol diers pan icked
and started fir ing, caus ing an all-Aus trian bat tle that re sulted in thou sands of
ca su al ties.17 The Amer i can mil i tary has suf fered from equally em bar rass ing in -
ci dents. Dur ing the 1943 Amer i can and Ca na dian in va sion of the Aleu tian is -
land of Kiska, twenty-eight Amer i cans were killed and an other fifty wounded on 
the first day de spite the pre vi ous de par ture of all Jap a nese forces.18
Not only are his tor i cal ex am ples of friendly fire so prev a lent as to be char ac -
ter ized as nor mal rather than ex cep tional, but the causes of these in ci dents are so 
nu mer ous as to pre clude easy ex pla na tion. In some cases, friendly fire was the
re sult of in ex pe ri ence and in ad e quate train ing. For ex am ple, in 1643, dur ing the
Eng lish Civil War, poorly trained and in ex pe ri enced par lia men tary in fan try or -
ga nized in three lines at tacked a heavily for ti fied build ing held by roy al ist
troops. In stead of the for ward line fir ing first and then re tir ing to the rear to re -
load while the next line in turn fired, all three fired si mul ta neously, ef fec tively
elim i nat ing the front rank.19
A pleth ora of other causes have been sug gested as well: stress, in ad e quate co -
or di na tion, faulty in for ma tion, re duced vis i bil ity, in ad e quate train ing, cha otic
con di tions, in ex pe ri ence, psy cho log i cal war fare, low mo rale, panic and care less -
ness, mis iden ti fi ca tion, and the ne ces sity for split-sec ond de ci sions.20 The one
con stant in these in ci dents has been hu man er ror. At some point in the chain of
events lead ing to friendly-fire death, some one mis iden ti fied friend for foe, failed 
to pro vide crit i cal in for ma tion in an ac cu rate or timely way, failed to de ter mine
ac cu rately a lo ca tion, mis in ter preted an or der, or the like. 
Fur ther, the num ber of ca su al ties as so ci ated with friendly fire has of ten been
stun ning. One French gen eral es ti mated that ap prox i mately sev enty-five thou -
sand French ca su al ties in World War I were caused by French ar til lery fire.21 An
es ti mated 5 per cent of Viet nam ca su al ties were at trib uted to friendly fire.22 Dur -
ing the first Per sian Gulf War, Op er a tion DESERT STORM, 23–24 per cent of U.S.
fa tal i ties and 77 per cent of Amer i can ve hi cle losses were at trib uted to friendly
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fire.23 One mil i tary scholar opines that 10–15 per cent of U.S. ca su al ties dur ing
the twen ti eth cen tury were caused by friendly fire, which equates to be tween
177,000 and 250,000 ca su al ties.24
As dis cussed in this ar ti cle, the lion’s share of U.S. friendly-fire in ci dents ap -
pear to in volve the Air Force (and its pre de ces sor Army Air Corps) and Army
and Ma rine Corps ground forces. How ever, the Navy has not been im mune to
this prob lem, be ing both the vic tim and per pe tra tor of such in ci dents. A 1995
Na val War Col lege Re view ar ti cle re ports fifty-three World War II in ci dents in
which “U.S. ves sels were dam aged or sunk by Al lied weap ons,” re sult ing in over
six hun dred ca su al ties, in ad di tion to the “many in stances of na val air craft losses
due to friendly fire.”25 The ar ti cle fur ther iden ti fies U.S. na val ves sels that were
the vic tims of friendly fire dur ing the Ko rean War, Viet nam, and DESERT
STORM.26
Nor has friendly fire dis crim i nated in terms of rank. In the wake of the Nor -
mandy land ings in World War II, Al lied bomb ers ac ci den tally at tacked the U.S.
30th In fan try Di vi sion, caus ing 814 ca su al ties, in clud ing Lieu ten ant Gen eral
Lesley McNair, who was killed.27
In ter est ing from the le gal stand point (in terms of self-de fense and jus ti fi ca -
tion de fenses) are the un usual, but not com pletely un heard-of, in stances of
friendly-fire re cip i ents de fend ing them selves though know ing their at tack ers to
be friendly forces. Dur ing the in va sion of Kiska, where there was no en emy re sis -
tance, “one Amer i can sol dier, con vinced he was at tack ing a Jap a nese unit, had to
be de lib er ately shot down by his com rades as he in sisted on charg ing and fling -
ing gre nades as he ran, even though they shouted at him to stop in Eng lish.”28
Fur ther, dur ing the Sic ily cam paign, Amer i can ground forces were fre quently at -
tacked by Amer i can air forces. In deed, Gen eral Omar Bradley was strafed (un -
suc cess fully) three times in a sin gle day.29 Dur ing one such in ci dent, a U.S. tank
col umn shot down the Amer i can plane and cap tured its pi lot.30 
Dur ing World War II, Amer i can pa trol tor pedo (PT) boats and air craft in the
South Pa cific fre quently in flicted ca su al ties on each other. In one in ci dent in July 
1943, four Army B-25s at tacked two Navy PT boats, sink ing one. In turn, the re -
main ing PT boat shot down one of the Army air craft, kill ing three of the crew.31
In one par tic u larly bi zarre in ci dent dur ing World War II, an Amer i can
tank-de stroyer pla toon opened fire on a tank col umn; it ceased fir ing when it re -
al ized the tanks were Amer i cans, but the tanks con tin ued to re turn fire even af -
ter they had come close enough to iden tify the tank-de stroyer unit pos i tively as
Amer i can. The tanks passed through the first Amer i can unit and pro ceeded to
at tack an ad join ing Amer i can unit. As soon as they took up po si tion on a nearby
hill, the tanks in turn were at tacked by Amer i can air craft.32 
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FRIENDLY FIRE THROUGH THE PRISM OF MIL I TARY LAW
When ex am in ing the ef fi cacy of the mil i tary jus tice sys tem in the friendly-fire
con text, one should start by look ing through the prism of the ap pli ca ble crim i -
nal stan dard. Since 1951 mem bers of the armed forces have been sub ject to the
Uni form Code of Mil i tary Jus tice (UCMJ). Prior to the UCMJ, the Army fol -
lowed the Ar ti cles of War, and the Navy was sub ject to the Ar ti cles for the Gov -
ern ment of the Navy, which made sim i lar pu ni tive ar ti cles avail able to pros e cute
friendly-fire deaths. The fol low ing are com mon friendly-fire-re lated of fenses.
The UCMJ con tains a hi er ar chy of ho mi cide of fenses, rang ing from pre med i -
tated mur der (ar ti cle 118) to neg li gent ho mi cide (ar ti cle 134). Pre med i tated
mur der im poses the heavi est bur den on the gov ern ment but also au tho rizes the
great est level of pun ish ment—death. To achieve a con vic tion for pre med i tated
mur der, the trial coun sel (pros e cu tor) must prove that the ac cused (de fen dant)
acted with a “pre med i tated de sign to kill”—that is, a spe cific in tent to kill, with
con sid er ation of the act in tended.33 By com par i son, a con vic tion for neg li gent
ho mi cide re quires only proof that the ac cused’s ac tion or fail ure to act con sti -
tuted sim ple neg li gence (lack of due care); no spe cific in tent to kill need be
proven.34 The max i mum pun ish ment for a neg li gent ho mi cide con vic tion com -
prises a dis hon or able dis charge, for fei ture of all pay and al low ances, and three
years’ con fine ment. How ever, re gard less of the of fense charged, the UCMJ re -
quires that all of fenses be proven be yond rea son able doubt, the high est level of
proof known to the law.35 
Two of fenses likely to be charged un der the UCMJ in a friendly-fire in ci dent
are in vol un tary man slaugh ter, un der ar ti cle 119, and the lesser in cluded of fense
of neg li gent ho mi cide. In vol un tary man slaugh ter is on the low end of the hier -
archy of ho mi cide of fenses and re quires proof of cul pa ble neg li gence, which is
de fined in part as “a neg li gent act or omis sion ac com pa nied by a cul pa ble dis re -
gard for the fore see able con se quences to oth ers of that act or omis sion.”36 It is
fur ther de fined as “a neg li gent act or fail ure to act ac com pa nied by a gross, reck -
less, wan ton, or de lib er ate dis re gard for the fore see able re sults to oth ers.”37 The
ba sis of such a charge “may be a neg li gent act or omis sion that, when viewed in
the light of hu man ex pe ri ence, might foreseeably re sult in the death of an other,
even though the death would not nec es sar ily be a nat u ral and prob a ble con se -
quence of the act or omis sion.”38 As ex am ples of cul pa ble neg li gence, the Man -
ual for Courts-Mar tial of fers “neg li gently con duct ing tar get prac tice so that the
bul lets go in the di rec tion of an in hab ited house within range; point ing a pis tol
in jest at an other and pull ing the trig ger, be liev ing, but with out tak ing rea son -
able pre cau tions to as cer tain, that it would not be dan ger ous; and care lessly leav -
ing poi sons or dan ger ous drugs where they may en dan ger life.”39 
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Neg li gent ho mi cide is sim i lar to in vol un tary man slaugh ter but re quires a
lower de gree of care less ness or neg li gence. The ac cused’s ac tion or fail ure to act
that re sulted in the death need rise only to the level of “sim ple” neg li gence: “the
ab sence of due care, that is, an act or omis sion of a per son who is un der a duty to
use due care which ex hib its a lack of that de gree of care of the safety of oth ers
which a rea son ably care ful per son would have ex er cised un der the same or sim i -
lar cir cum stances.”40 
An other likely charge is der e lic tion of duty, which is pun ish able un der UCMJ
ar ti cle 92(3). This pu ni tive ar ti cle re quires proof that the ac cused had cer tain
du ties that he or she knew of, or rea son ably should have known of, and that the
ac cused was ei ther will fully (i.e., in ten tion ally) or through ne glect or cul pa ble
in ef fi ciency der e lict in per form ing those du ties.41 In di vid u als per form du ties
“neg li gently” when, it be ing their duty to use due care, they act in a way “which
ex hib its a lack of de gree of that de gree of care which a rea son ably pru dent per -
son would have ex er cised un der the same or sim i lar cir cum stances.” Cul pa ble
in ef fi ciency is de fined as “in ef fi ciency for which there is no rea son able or just ex -
cuse.”42 Mere in ep ti tude as a rea son for fail ure to per form a duty serves as a de -
fense against this charge.43 
The “duty may be im posed by treaty, stat ute, reg u la tion, law ful or der, stan -
dard op er at ing pro ce dure, or cus tom of the ser vice.”44 The pu ni tive ar ti cle is
broad enough to en com pass a duty im posed by rules of en gage ment. Al though
the courts have de ter mined that they will not re quire a higher stan dard to es tab -
lish the “crim i nal ity of tac ti cal-non per for mance de ci sions by mil i tary line of fi -
cers,” they will “not sub sti tute hind sight for fore sight” when de ter min ing
whether the ac cused acted neg li gently.45 In com par i son to other of fenses un der
the UCMJ, the bur den on the pros e cu tion is not par tic u larly oner ous, a fact re -
flected in the max i mum sen tence. Der e lic tion of duty through ne glect or cul pa -
ble in ef fi ciency sub jects the ac cused to a max i mum sen tence of only three
months’ con fine ment and for fei ture of two-thirds pay per month for three
months.46 
Con vic tions un der ar ti cle 92(3) have en com passed a wide range of mis con -
duct. To il lus trate, ser vice mem bers have been con victed of der e lic tion of duty
for fail ing to post road guides in pairs and main tain a ros ter of posted guides, re -
sult ing in the death of a guide by ex po sure dur ing a desert ex er cise; will fully per -
mit ting a sub or di nate to sign falsely an of fi cial re port; fail ing to use other
avail able ra dar ranges while nav i gat ing a ship through a nar row pas sage at night
af ter re ceiv ing con flict ing in for ma tion con cern ing the ship’s po si tion; and fail -
ing to main tain “an alert and re spon si ble watch.”47 
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AP PLI CA TION OF THE MIL I TARY JUS TICE SYS TEM TO
FRIENDLY-FIRE IN CI DENTS
Through out Amer i can mil i tary his tory, re ported in stances of use of the mil i tary
jus tice sys tem in re sponse to friendly-fire in ci dents have been ex ceed ingly rare.
How ever, sev eral his tor i cal cases do ex ist and war rant re view.
The Amer i can Civil War and the Death of Stone wall Jack son 
One of the best known friendly-fire in ci dents in Amer i can mil i tary his tory in -
volved the shoot ing of Con fed er ate gen eral Thomas J. “Stone wall” Jack son. On 2 
May 1863, dur ing the bat tle of Chancellorsville, Vir ginia, Jack son was mor tally
wounded by his own men. While Jack son was con duct ing a mounted night time
re con nais sance of his for ward lines, sol diers of the 7th North Carolina Reg i ment 
fired on him and his staff, be liev ing them to be Un ion sol diers.48 Jack son and his
party rode on through the pitch-black for est to ward the 18th North Carolina
Reg i ment, whose sol diers also started shoot ing at them, also be liev ing them to
be at tack ing Un ion sol diers. One of Jack son’s aides yelled, “Cease fir ing! You are
fir ing into your own men!”49 Ma jor John D. Barry of the 18th North Carolina re -
sponded, “It’s a lie! Pour it to them, boys!” The reg i ment fired into the group,
hit ting Jack son in the left shoul der, the left fore arm, and right palm.50 In ad di -
tion to Jack son, four mem bers of his staff were killed and three wounded.51 Jack -
son ini tially sur vived his wounds, but his left arm was am pu tated the fol low ing
day, and he died of wound-re lated pneu mo nia on 10 May.52
Al though the Con fed er acy had a func tion ing mil i tary jus tice sys tem, there is
no re cord of any courts-mar tial in volv ing the Jack son shoot ing.53 In deed, Ma jor
Barry was pro moted to col o nel af ter the bat tle. A vet eran of sev eral bat tles, Barry 
com manded the 18th North Carolina at the bat tle of Get tys burg and even tu ally
rose to the rank of bri ga dier gen eral.54
World War II: The Sic ily In va sion
An other sig nif i cant friendly-fire in ci dent in which no courts-mar tial re sulted,
al though such ac tion was se ri ously con sid ered, oc curred dur ing the World War
II in va sion of Sic ily. On the third day of the in va sion, in July 1943, three bat tal -
ions and an en gi neer com pany of the 82nd Air borne Di vi sion, some 1,092 men,
were or dered to make a night para chute jump into Sic ily.55 De spite ex ten sive co -
or di na tion with Army and Navy units in the area, the para troop ers flew into a
wall of an ti air craft fire near the Amer i can beach head. The air borne force suf -
fered se vere dam age to or to tal loss of sixty of 145 air craft; ap prox i mately sixty
air men were ca su al ties, and 229 para troop ers were killed, wounded, or miss -
ing.56 Gen eral Dwight D. Ei sen hower, com mand ing the Eu ro pean The ater of
Op er a tions, was livid, or der ing Sev enth Army com mander George Patton, who
feared being re lieved him self, to con duct an im me di ate in ves ti ga tion into what
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Ei sen hower as sumed to have been “in ex cus able care less ness and neg li gence on
the part of some one,” to fix re spon si bil ity, and to take dis ci plin ary ac tion.57 
Even tu ally three re ports were sub mit ted to Ei sen hower. The se nior air borne
ad viser, Bri ga dier Fred er ick “Boy” Brown ing of the Brit ish army, blamed in ad e -
quately trained avi a tors. An Amer i can gen eral, Joe Swing, blamed the di sas ter on 
a com bi na tion of five er rors: in ad e quate co or di na tion of air routes with
nonairborne forces; in abil ity of the in suf fi ciently trained air men to fol low the
com plex air routes; the Navy’s rigid pol icy of fir ing on all air craft; sched ul ing the 
air borne op er a tion in the af ter math of sus tained Axis ae rial at tacks on the fleet,
in clud ing twenty-three sep a rate at tacks the day of the jump; and fail ure to warn
Army an ti air craft units ad e quately of the pend ing op er a tion.58 In his re port to
Ei sen hower, the 82nd’s com mand ing gen eral, Mat thew Ridgway, fore stalled fu -
ture dis ci plin ary ac tion by Ei sen hower by con clud ing that “the re spon si bil ity for 
loss of life and ma te rial re sult ing from this op er a tion is so di vided, so dif fi cult to
fix with im par tial jus tice, and so ques tion able of ul ti mate value to the ser vice be -
cause of the ac ri mo ni ous de bates which would fol low ef forts to hold re spon si ble 
per sons or ser vices to ac count, that dis ci plin ary ac tion is of doubt ful wis dom.”59 
The Ko rean War: A Rare Court-Mar tial Con vic tion
The Ko rean War saw one of the few suc cess ful friendly-fire pros e cu tions. In
United States v. Perruccio, an Army pri vate was con victed of neg li gent ho mi cide
af ter shoot ing an other Amer i can sol dier whom the ac cused al leged he had mis -
taken for an en emy in fil tra tor.60 The two sol diers had been in a five-man
half-track crew ap prox i mately one mile from the en emy lines, with friendly in -
fan try be tween them and the en emy.61 At night, one sol dier, re lieved ev ery two
hours, would stand guard while the re main ing four slept in a nearby bunker. The 
guard ha bit u ally en tered the bunker to check the fire in the stove, the bunker’s
only source of light. Al though the bunker had re ceived no small-arms fire, the
unit was un der a two-week-long alert against in fil tra tors and guer rilla at tacks.62
Ap prox i mately fifty min utes af ter tak ing over, the guard en tered the bunker
to check the stove. Pri vate Perruccio, whom he had just re lieved, grabbed his car -
bine and fired sev eral rounds at the guard, kill ing him. Nei ther man said a
word.63 Perruccio later ar gued that the kill ing was jus ti fied be cause he had rea -
son ably be lieved the vic tim to be an en emy in fil tra tor, but his de fense failed; he
was deemed neg li gent in not at tempt ing to de ter mine the iden tity of the vic tim
be fore fir ing.64 He was sen tenced to re ceive a bad-con duct dis charge, for feit all
pay and al low ances, and be con fined for a year, but ul ti mately his sen tence was
re mit ted.65
By way of com par i son, a sec ond court-mar tial con vic tion in that war for in vol -
un tary man slaugh ter was re versed on ap peal. In United States v. Tigert, Cor po ral
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Tigert had gone to sleep in a sleep ing bag on a cot when the vic tim—“drunk, stag -
ger ing and bois ter ous”—sat on him, pushed him par tially off the cot, twisted his
arm, and de manded whis key.66 Be cause his unit was in close prox im ity to the
front lines, Tigert, who was char ac ter ized as an “ex cel lent” sol dier, had a loaded
pis tol within reach and now re acted in stinc tively, “with out any par tic u lar
thought run ning through his mind un less it was ‘maybe in fil tra tors or some -
thing.’”67 He woke quickly out of a sound sleep, swing ing his pis tol, which dis -
charged, kill ing the drunken sol dier.68 
Plac ing par tic u lar em pha sis on the com bat set ting, the Army Board of Re view 
pos ited that the ev i dence was in suf fi cient to sus tain an in vol un tary man slaugh -
ter con vic tion or even the lesser in cluded of fense of neg li gent ho mi cide.69 The
board found it “highly prob a ble that any per son be ing so aroused in sim i lar sur -
round ings would first think of ‘in fil tra tors’ and act on the spur of the mo ment as 
did the ac cused.”70 Sig nif i cantly for pur poses of this ar ti cle, the board fur ther
em pha sized the con text in which the ac cused was to be judged: “It must be
conceded that sol diers in jected into such a sit u a tion where hard ship and dan -
ger to life and limb are ever pres ent can be ex pected to act in fur ther ance of
self-pres er va tion some what dif fer ently than their com rades en gaged in gar ri -
son duty. We have no rea son to be lieve that this ac cused is any dif fer ent than
other sol diers in their re ac tion to the stress of armed com bat.”71 
Viet nam: An Un suc cess ful Court-Mar tial
Dur ing the Viet nam War, friendly-fire in ci dents were in ves ti gated, but (at least
within the Army) find ings of ac tion able neg li gence were pun ished un der ar ti cle
15 of the UCMJ (i.e., as nonjudicial pun ish ment).72 How ever, at least one
friendly-fire in ci dent gen er ated a court-mar tial, ul ti mately re sult ing in an ac -
quit tal. On 17 Au gust 1970 a Ma rine mor tar squad sup port ing its par ent com -
pany fired at a tree line that had pre vi ously pro duced sniper fire.73 The rounds at
first struck the tree line but then be gan to land at the base of a hill oc cu pied by
the par ent com pany and then to “walk” back into its po si tion, kill ing three Ma -
rines and a Viet nam ese pris oner and wound ing an ad di tional thirty Ma rines.74
An ini tial in ves ti ga tion in di cated that the later rounds had been fired at a high
an gle, vir tu ally straight up into the air.75 Fur ther, the in ves ti ga tion opined that
the Ma rine mor tar squad “had fired more rounds than nec es sary in or der to
avoid hav ing to carry them back to [the land ing zone] and had sim ply been care -
less in the con trol of its fire.”76
The Ma rine Corps charged the squad leader and his as sis tant with neg li gent
ho mi cide, and it also charged the squad leader “with neg li gence in in struct ing and 
su per vis ing his mor tar squad.”77 A third Ma rine gun ner was also charged, but the
charges were dropped af ter he ac cepted im mu nity in ex change for his tes ti mony.78
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The Ma rine Corps de fense at tor neys in ves ti gated and pre pared for the trial
ex ten sively. They gath ered wit nesses to put on a “good sol dier” de fense and also
col lected suf fi cient ev i dence for an al ter na tive ex pla na tion—that the ca su al ties
had ac tu ally been in flicted by en emy mor tars us ing re cov ered Amer i can rounds
and tak ing ad van tage of the Ma rine squad’s fire to mask their at tack.79 Af ter a
ten-day trial, the panel of of fi cers de lib er ated for five min utes and ac quit ted the
as sis tant squad leader; a sec ond five-day trial of the squad leader also re sulted in
ac quit tal.80
Op er a tion DESERT STORM
As noted ear lier, ap prox i mately a quar ter of all U.S. fa tal i ties dur ing Op er a tion
DESERT STORM were caused by friendly fire. One of the most pub li cized friendly- 
fire in ci dents in volved the 27 Feb ru ary 1991 death of Cor po ral Douglas Fielder,
as signed to the 54th En gi neer Bat tal ion, 1st Ar mor Di vi sion (1st AD), which was 
part of the U.S. Army VII Corps.
On the af ter noon of 26 Feb ru ary, the M548 am mu ni tion car rier crewed by
Cor po ral Fielder and a sec ond sol dier be came dis abled. The en gi neer com pany
com mander or dered his ex ec u tive of fi cer and the crew of two other ve hi cles to
re main with the M548 un til it could be re cov ered the fol low ing day. The three
ve hi cles were marked with an in verted V, an antifratricide rec og ni tion sym bol. A 
sec ond antifratricide night time de vice, a black out light mounted on a pole on
the M548, was in op er a ble.81
At ap prox i mately 2:30 AM, a troop from the 3rd Ar mored Cav alry Reg i ment
(3rd ACR), hav ing passed through its ob jec tive, an Iraqi air field, crossed a
nearby VII Corps/XVIII Air borne Corps bound ary line into an area con trolled
by the 1st AD. The 3rd ACR served as a screen ing force to pro tect the XVIII Air -
borne Corps’s right flank. By now, how ever, co or di na tion along the corps
bound ary had “dis in te grated.”82 Fur ther, ap prox i mately two hours be fore the in -
ci dent, the 3rd ACR’s rules of en gage ment were changed, the new rules in clud -
ing an or der not to cross the bound ary line and not to “fire un less fired upon.”83
As el e ments of the 3rd ACR moved for ward, one of its troop com manders in
an Abrams tank de tected two of the en gi neers in his ther mal sights and mis tak -
enly be lieved them to be en emy sol diers; he fur ther mis tak enly iden ti fied the en -
gi neer ve hi cles as build ings. The troop com mander re ceived per mis sion to fire
warn ing shots, which, he and his gun ner be lieved, pro duced re turn fire. He en -
gaged the tar get area un til his squad ron com mander ra di oed a cease-fire. One of
the en gi neers was wounded in the leg.84 The en gi neers had not seen any warn ing
shots and later de nied re turn ing fire.85
Within min utes of the in ci dent, the squad ron com mander ar rived with five ve -
hi cles and dis mounted two sol diers from a Bradley Fight ing Ve hi cle to ap proach
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the sus pected en emy sol diers but failed to ob tain the troop com mander’s sit u a -
tional as sess ment. The squad ron com mander and his gun ner ob served at least one 
of the en gi neer ve hi cles on fire and fig ures run ning from them. Con cerned that
the flee ing fig ures were es cap ing en emy, the squad ron com mander granted his
gun ner’s re quest to fire into the ground im me di ately in front of them. By this
time, other 3rd ACR sol diers had iden ti fied the en gi neer ve hi cles as American. At
this point the en gi neer ex ec u tive of fi cer fired a green star clus ter, which was a day -
time antifratricide sig nal. (A white star clus ter was the night time antifratricide
rec og ni tion sig nal.) The squad ron com mander’s gun ner then fired, kill ing Cor po -
ral Fielder. The en gi neer ex ec u tive of fi cer ap proached the 3rd ACR ve hi cles with a
flash light and his hands raised. Once he was iden ti fied as an Amer i can, a cease-fire 
or der was re layed to the re main ing 3rd ACR ve hi cles.86
The frat ri cide was im me di ately re ported to the 3rd ACR com mander and
then to the di vi sion and corps lev els. Sub se quent in ves ti ga tions by a judge ad vo -
cate cap tain from the 3rd ACR and later by an XVIII Air borne Corps in ves ti gat -
ing of fi cer de ter mined that the sol diers in volved in the shoot ing had “acted
re spon si bly.”87 How ever, a third re view, by Forces Com mand (FORSCOM), dis -
agreed; the “FORSCOM staff judge ad vo cate con cluded that four of the of fi cers
in volved in the frat ri cide were neg li gent and der e lict in per form ing their du -
ties.”88 The FORSCOM staff judge ad vo cate rec om mended that the 3rd ACR,
squad ron, and troop com mand ers re ceive let ters of rep ri mand and that the en -
gi neer ex ec u tive of fi cer re ceive a let ter of ad mon ish ment for not hav ing taken
suf fi cient de fen sive mea sures be fore hand or do ing more to pro tect his men dur -
ing the in ci dent.89 Fi nally, un sat is fied with the Army’s ef forts, Fielder’s par ents,
who had ini tially been in formed that the Iraqis had killed their son, con tacted
Sen a tors Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.) and Fred Thomp son (R-Tenn.), who in turn ini ti -
ated a more com pre hen sive re view by the Gen eral Ac count ing Of fice.90
No courts-mar tial re sulted from the friendly-fire in ci dent. Ul ti mately, the
FORSCOM com mander or dered that the troop com mand ers’ rep ri mand be
with drawn, that the en gi neer of fi cer’s let ter of ad mo ni tion re main in place, and
that the squad ron and 3rd ACR com mander’s let ters of rep ri mand not be placed
in their of fi cial per son nel re cords. How ever, the troop com mander re ceived an
ad verse Of fi cer Eval u a tion Re port.91 Also, the Army re voked seven awards for
valor given to sol diers as signed to or at tached to the 3rd ACR for ac tions re lated
to the in ci dent, be cause the award doc u men ta tion in di cated that the sol diers
had re ceived hos tile fire from the en emy.92
Op er a tion PROVIDE COMFORT
One of the most puz zling and seem ingly avoid able friendly-fire in ci dents oc -
curred dur ing the Amer i can en force ment of a “no-fly zone” in north ern Iraq as
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part of Op er a tion PROVIDE COMFORT. On 14 April 1994, two Air Force F-15s, pi -
loted by ex pe ri enced and well trained pi lots, shot down two Army Black Hawk
UH-60 he li cop ters, car ry ing six teen United Na tions co ali tion per son nel, in the
no-fly zone. The he li cop ters, which were us ing op er a tional Iden ti fi ca tion,
Friend or Foe (IFF) sys tems, had been fly ing in broad day light, in ex cel lent vis i -
bil ity, in an area de void of sig nif i cant Iraqi ac tion for over a year; an Air Force
Air borne Warn ing and Con trol Sys tem (AWACS) con trol ler who had con tact
with all four air craft failed to in ter vene.93 Twenty-six peo ple died as a re sult. 
The Air Force pi lots en tered the no-fly zone ex pect ing to be the only friendly
air craft in the area, not hav ing been in formed of the pres ence of the Army he li -
cop ters ei ther by the AWACS or in their preflight brief ing.94 De tect ing the he li -
cop ters and fail ing to ob tain a friendly IFF sig nal, the first pi lot made a
vi sual-iden ti fi ca tion pass and mis took the Army Black Hawks as Iraqi Hind
gunships. His wing man, asked to con firm the Hinds, also made a pass and re -
ported “Tally two,” mean ing that he only could con firm the ex is tence of two he -
li cop ters. But the lead pi lot in ter preted the re port as a con fir ma tion of his
iden ti fi ca tion of the air craft as Iraqi Hinds.95 Al though the he li cop ters posed no
se ri ous threat to the F-15s and could not have es caped the much faster jets, the
pi lots did not make fur ther vi sual-iden ti fi ca tion passes.96
The Black Hawks bore dark for est-green cam ou flage pat terns and had six
Amer i can flags painted on var i ous parts of their air frames, while the So viet-
made Iraqi Hind used a light tan and brown cam ou flage.97 Nev er the less, ac cu -
rate vi sual iden ti fi ca tion of the Amer i can he li cop ters was dif fi cult. The lead pi -
lot con ducted his vi sual con fir ma tion “at a speed of about 450 knots (522 mph),
on a glide path ap prox i mately 500 feet above and 1,000 feet to the left of the he li -
cop ters.”98 When the wing man passed by the he li cop ters “at fif teen hun dred to
two thou sand feet to their right, he saw two he li cop ters and pulled up quickly
call ing, ‘Tally two.’”99 
The two Black Hawks con tacted the AWACS at least three times be fore the
shoot-down but had no knowl edge of, or ra dio con tact with, the F-15s.100 Fur ther,
un like the F-15s, the Army he li cop ters did not have HAVE QUICK II fre quency-
hop ping ra dios and com mu ni cated with the AWACS on a dif fer ent ra dio fre -
quency than the fight ers used.101 In any case, al though both the F-15s and Black
Hawks were un der the con trol of the same AWACS air craft (an E-3 Sen try,
adapted from the Boe ing 707 de sign), they com mu ni cated with dif fer ent con trol -
lers, who were phys i cally sep a rated.102 Fur ther, the Black Hawks were us ing a dif -
fer ent IFF Mode I code than the Air Force used in the no-fly air space over
north ern Iraq, re ferred to as the tac ti cal area of re spon si bil ity (TAOR); the Black
Hawks had ob served that prac tice for over a year but had never been in formed of
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the need to switch to a dif fer ent IFF code.103 The AWACS’s du ties in cluded con -
trol ling co ali tion air craft fly ing in the TAOR, and pro vid ing “air borne threat
warn ing and air con trol for all Op er a tion Pro vide Com fort air craft.”104
Min utes be fore the F-15s en tered the TAOR, the Black Hawks en tered a
moun tain ous val ley, caus ing ra dar and IFF con tacts to fade.105 The AWACS,
which un like the fight ers mon i tored the Black Hawks’ IFF code, still re ceived in -
ter mit tent IFF sig nals from them, and IFF re turns were vis i ble on its ra dar
scopes.106 
The AWACS, which was fly ing with a crew of nine teen, had had ear lier ra dio
con tact with the only four air craft in the TAOR—the two F-15s and the two
Army UH-60s.107 Al though the AWACS’s crew mem bers were all in di vid u ally
well trained and ex pe ri enced, this was its first flight as a crew in the TAOR, and
two in struc tors had been added.108 Un for tu nately, at the time of the shoot-down
one in struc tor was in the gal ley on break, and the sec ond was tak ing a nap.109
Also, two other mem bers of the crew were read ing books, one was asleep, and
an other was mon i tor ing ra dios with his eyes closed.110 Fur ther, the AWACS crew
was la bor ing un der some con fu sion as to its he li cop ter-track ing re spon si bil i ties.111
Ul ti mately, af ter an ex haus tive in ves ti ga tion, an Air Force in ves ti ga tion board 
found that the in ci dent “was ‘caused by a chain of events,’” which was ul ti mately
sum ma rized by the sec re tary of de fense as com pris ing four fac tors:
• The F-15 pi lots mis iden ti fied the Black Hawks.
• The AWACS crew failed to in ter vene.
• Ea gle flight [the Army Black Hawks] and their op er a tions were not in te grated
into the Task Force.
• The Iden ti fi ca tion Friend or Foe (IFF) sys tems failed.112
The Air Force pre ferred (i.e., for mally ini ti ated) der e lic tion-of-duty charges
against five mem bers of the AWACS crew, pre ferred neg li gent-ho mi cide and
der e lic tion-of-duty charges against the sec ond (wing man) pi lot, and granted
im mu nity to the lead pi lot in ex change for his tes ti mony.113 How ever, the ar ti cle
32 hear ing, the mil i tary’s func tional equiv a lent of a grand-jury pro ceed ing, re -
ferred only one in di vid ual to a court-mar tial (i.e., or dered the charges pros e -
cuted). The AWACS se nior di rec tor, an Air Force cap tain, was tried for der e lic tion
of duty, for “al leg edly fail ing to ad e quately su per vise the AWACS crew and not no -
ti fy ing the fight ers of the Army he li cop ters’ pres ence.”114 The cap tain was ac quit -
ted. In re sponse, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force grounded the two pi lots and
three AWACS crew mem bers and is sued ca reer-end ing let ters of dis ap proval to
those five, as well as two su per vi sory gen eral of fi cers.115
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The en tire court-mar tial pro cess proved con tro ver sial and ul ti mately un -
satis fy ing to the fam i lies of the vic tims and to many in the Air Force. Sev eral of
the vic tims’ fam i lies and some within the uni formed Air Force lead er ship were
up set that no one was held pub licly ac count able through the mil i tary jus tice sys -
tem, while some in the AWACS com mu nity com plained that sin gling out the se -
nior di rec tor was an un fair and mo rale-de grad ing ef fort to blame the AWACS
crew and re flected an in sti tu tional bias in fa vor of pi lots.116 In deed, re spond ing
to crit i cism that the ac cused had been un fairly sin gled out for pros e cu tion, Sec -
re tary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall took the un usual, and ul ti mately un suc -
cess ful, step of ask ing Sec re tary of De fense Wil liam Perry to halt the pro ceed-
ings, al though she also pos sessed such au thor ity.117 
Af ghan i stan and the Ac ci den tal Bomb ing of Ca na dian Troops
On 12 April 2002, an Air Na tional Guard F-16 fly ing over Af ghan i stan dropped a 
five-hun dred-pound la ser-guided bomb on Ca na dian forces par tic i pat ing in a
night time live-fire ex er cise in a train ing area used reg u larly by co ali tion forces
for such pur poses.118 The bomb wounded eight Ca na dian sol diers and killed
four, the first Ca na dian sol diers to die in com bat since the Ko rean War.119 
The two F-16s had been fly ing at ap prox i mately fif teen thou sand feet, at the
end of a ten-hour pa trol, when they saw ground fire and thought they were be ing 
shot at by ground forces and “a piece of ar til lery.”120 The wing man con tacted an
Air Force AWACS and re quested per mis sion to en gage the tar gets with 20-mm
fire, but the AWACS re plied, “Hold fire. I need de tails on safire [sur face-to-air
fire].”121 The lead pi lot too noted that they needed to “make sure it’s not friend -
lies.”122 Af ter the pi lots’ eva sive ma neu vers to avoid the per ceived at tack, the
wing man an nounced that he was “roll ing in in self-de fense,” to which the
AWACS re plied, “Boss man cop ies.”123 Both pi lots then used la sers to pin point
the tar get, and the wing man re leased the bomb.124 Af ter ward, the wing man
asked, “Can you con firm they were shoot ing us?” to which the AWACS re plied,
“You’re cleared. Self-de fense.”125
A U.S.-Ca na dian in ves ti ga tion and a sep a rate Ca na dian in ves ti ga tion found
the two pi lots to be at fault, al though the Ca na dian re port noted that the pi lots
had not been in formed of the train ing ex er cise.126 When the Air Force pre ferred
charges against the two pi lots for man slaugh ter, ag gra vated as sault, and der e lic -
tion of duty, the ar ti cle 32 of fi cer rec om mended against a court-mar tial, de spite
opin ing that suf fi cient ev i dence ex isted, in fa vor of nonjudicial pun ish ment.127
The Eighth Air Force com mander in tended to drop all charges against the lead
pi lot, is sue him a let ter of rep ri mand, and re move him from the pro mo tion list
but per mit him to re tire; he ac cepted the ar ti cle 32 of fi cer’s rec om men da tion
that the pi lot who had ac tu ally dropped the bomb face nonjudicial pun ish ment
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un der ar ti cle 15.128 De fense at tor neys had sug gested that the pi lots’ er ror might
have been at trib ut able to am phet amines, known as “go pills,” which the Air
Force is sued to pi lots for long mis sions.129
The wing man ini tially re jected the ar ti cle 15 of fer and elected to go to
court-mar tial but changed his mind af ter be ing as sured that he would be al lowed
to serve un til he was el i gi ble for re tire ment.130 Ul ti mately, the Eighth Air Force
com mander re jected a self-de fense ar gu ment, is sued the pi lot a harshly worded
rep ri mand, and fined him $5,672.131
The ap pli ca tion of the mil i tary jus tice sys tem to this friendly-fire in ci dent
again proved con tro ver sial. The two pi lots, mem bers of the Il li nois Na tional
Guard, en joyed lo cal sup port dur ing the mil i tary pro ceed ings, in clud ing a
fund-raiser by the gov er nor of Il li nois to pay for their le gal fees.132 Air Force of fi -
cers voiced opin ions both sup port ive and crit i cal of the two pi lots;133 one Air
Force col o nel was rep ri manded for al leg ing that the Air Force in ves ti ga tive
board was sim ply “look ing for some one to blame.”134 Many Ca na di ans har bored
bit ter feel ings about the in ci dent.135
THERE BUT FOR THE GRACE OF GOD . . . 
Some friendly-fire in ci dents, while tragic, are also un der stand able and should
not rise to the level of court-mar tial of fenses. In deed, they may war rant no pun -
ish ment of any kind. Com bat ants must of ten make split-sec ond de ci sions con -
cern ing when and whom to shoot. Their judg ment may be clouded by re duced
vis i bil ity, fa tigue, or fear. These are the oft-de scribed “fog of war” sce nar ios. One
ob vi ous ex am ple is the shoot ing of Stone wall Jack son by his own troops: Jack son 
and his party came from the di rec tion of the en emy lines, at night, in a pause af -
ter an ex tended pe riod of com bat, while the Con fed er ates were still in con tact
with Un ion forces. Other in ci dents are in fi nitely more dif fi cult to un der stand.
The 1994 shoot -down of the Army Black Hawk he li cop ters stands out as one
such ex am ple.
Equally puz zling, given the rel a tive his tor i cal fre quency of such ac ci den tal
kill ings, is the al most com plete dearth of friendly-fire courts-mar tial. Fur ther,
when the rare friendly-fire in ci dent is re ferred to trial, the re sult ap pears to be al -
most in vari ably ac quit tal. Not hav ing made the re fer ral de ci sions, heard the ev i -
dence, or voted to ac quit, one can only guess at the causes of this anom aly. 
Per haps one is the fre quency of these in ci dents, lead ing the mil i tary com mu -
nity to ac cept them as the un for tu nate norm in com bat—“There but for the
grace of God go I.” Per haps it is the dif fi culty of fix ing le gal ac count abil ity in a
cha otic en vi ron ment, or iso lat ing the ac tion able mis take in a se ries of er rors,
or of at tempt ing to fo cus re spon si bil ity on an oth er wise good—per haps stel -
lar—sol dier who has made a hor ri ble, but not ma li cious, mis take. One
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pow er ful ar gu ment of ten raised against such courts-mar tial is the po ten tially
ad verse ef fect on the mo rale and fight ing abil i ties of those in com bat, that it
might make them hes i tant. Fur ther, one com men ta tor sug gests there may ex ist
an in sti tu tional cul tural im ped i ment—“the mil i tary’s long un spo ken ‘non-le gal’
re sponse to frat ri cide.”136 
The ap par ent lack of suc cess of the mil i tary’s crim i nal jus tice sys tem does not
ap pear to be a func tion of how the law is writ ten but rather of how it is ap plied.
For some the fail ure of the mil i tary jus tice sys tem to hold crim i nally ac count able 
those re spon si ble for friendly-fire deaths is a trav esty of jus tice, the prod uct of a
sys tem that places too much au thor ity in the hands of com mand ers and of an in -
sti tu tional cul ture of self-pro tec tion and unaccountability. How ever, it is more
likely that the se lec tive use of the mil i tary’s jus tice sys tem, and its even less fre -
quent suc cesses, sim ply re flects the re peated judg ment of a mil i tary so ci ety, with 
its unique cul ture, val ues, and mo res, bal anc ing con cepts of jus tice and dis ci -
pline as it ap plies a crim i nal sys tem to con duct un der the stress of com bat. Ser -
vice mem bers who make de ci sions to pur sue courts-mar tial or de ter mine
in no cence and guilt are in the same com mu nity as those who must make the
split-sec ond, life-and-death de ci sions in cha otic com bat sit u a tions. When a
service mem ber is re ferred for court-mar tial and sub se quently con victed of a
frat ri cide-re lated of fense, those de ci sions will have been made by mem bers of a
mil i tary com mu nity par tic u larly sen si tive to the col lat eral ef fects of such pro -
ceed ings and to the cir cum stances within which the chal lenged de ci sions are
made. In any case, even when those re spon si ble for friendly-fire deaths are not
held crim i nally re spon si ble, they re main sub ject to other forms of pun ish ment,
a less se vere but of ten ca reer-end ing re gime of nonjudicial pun ish ment, rep ri -
mands, and ad verse eval u a tions. 
Re gard less, some things ap pear cer tain. First, there will con tinue to be
friendly-fire in ci dents. If his tory is an ac cu rate gauge, they are in ev i ta ble. Sec -
ond, re gard less of the cause or cir cum stances, friendly-fire charges will re main
con tro ver sial and dif fi cult to prove be yond a rea son able doubt in courts-mar tial.
While the pros e cu tion at tempts to sec ond-guess the de ci sions of com bat ants,
oth ers will sec ond-guess the de ci sion to pur sue court-mar tial, and still oth ers
will ques tion the mil i tary’s fail ure to hold some one crim i nally re spon si ble for
friendly-fire deaths. Given the fre quency of multiservice and mul ti na tional in ci -
dents, greater trans par ency in the mil i tary jus tice de ci sion-mak ing pro cess may
be re quired. 
De spite sig nif i cant hand i caps, there re mains an im por tant role for the mil i -
tary jus tice sys tem. There will be oc ca sions when the facts are so egre gious, the
cul pa bil ity so pro nounced, or the der e lic tion of duty so man i fest that the mil i -
tary com mu nity will hold its own crim i nally ac count able.
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